Nouveau papier monstre de Ray Dalio, sorti la semaine derniere.
An in depth look at deleveragings
Attention, c’est très technique. Dalio etudie six deleveragings du siecle dernier et les compare a celui que vous vivons actuellement.
The Economist a aussi publie un bon papier sur le personnage et ses idées.
The man and the machine
Je note avec un certain amusement que Mr Dalio est devenu optimiste au sujet de l’Europe,
The Economist a écrit :
For now, he is in a more optimistic mood thanks to the European Central Bank’s recent moves, in effect, to print money. Although he still expects debt restructuring in Spain, Portugal, Italy and Ireland, on top of that in Greece, he says that the “risk of chaos has been reduced and we are now calming ourselves down.” Here’s hoping he is right again.
Alors qu’il y a six mois sa vision était autrement plus négative.
Ray Dalio, il y a six mois a écrit :
These challenges are being faced in different forms by most central banks at the same time as they are nearly out of ammunition – i.e., their capacities to ease are very limited because they cannot stimulate private credit creation and because they cannot get money in the hands of people who will spend it. For these reasons there is greater risk that central banks cannot save us as they have always saved us in the past.
Sur ce dernier point, je rejoins Mr Dalio (et les lecteurs de l’IH m’en sont temoins). Nos autorites font un travail remarquable, difficile et incompris. Les critiquer vertement a longueur de journée - sport national des internautes - a grand renfort de yakafaukon est le comble du cynisme et de la médiocrité.
Deux autres points qui ont retenu mon attention,
The Economist a écrit :
Mr Dalio admits he is wrong one third of the time.
L’humilité, vraiment la plus belle des vertus. Je sais que l’un des intervenants du forum se reconnaîtra :-)
Ray Dalio a écrit :
Reading history is the best way to perform as an investor.
Ce qui rejoint le conseil d’un autre monstre,
Charlie Munger a écrit :
Read history, read history, read history.
Pour ceux qui ont loupe un épisode, une rapide explication du deleveraging,
The Economist a écrit :
Two sorts of credit cycle are at the heart of Mr Dalio’s economic model: the business cycle, which typically lasts five to eight years, and a long-term (“long wave”) debt cycle, which can last 50-70 years. A business cycle usually ends in a recession, because the central bank raises the interest rate, reducing borrowing and demand. The debt cycle ends in deleveraging because there is a “shortage of capable providers of capital and/or a shortage of capable recipients of capital (borrowers and sellers of equity) that cannot be rectified by the central bank changing the cost of money.” Business cycles happen often, they are well understood and policymakers are fairly adept at managing them. A debt cycle tends to come along in a country once in a lifetime, tends to be poorly understood and is often mishandled by policymakers.
An ordinary recession can be ended by the central bank lowering the interest rate again. A deleveraging is much harder to end. According to Mr Dalio, it usually requires some combination of debt restructurings and write-offs, austerity, wealth transfers from rich to poor and money-printing. A “beautiful deleveraging” is one in which all these elements combine to keep the economy growing at a nominal rate that is higher than the nominal interest rate.
Notez que certains ne partagent pas le diagnostic de Mr. Dalio.
A deleveraging? What deleveraging?
Comme d’habitude quand on commence a penser quelque chose, il est sain de se mettre a penser l’inverse.
Marc-Aurele a écrit :
Ce que vous voyez est une perspective, pas la réalité. Ce que vous entendez est une opinion, pas un fait.
Bonne lecture.
Dernière modification par thomz (12/03/2012 06h30)
Membres
1 
7 #1 09/01/2012 11h45
Hors ligne
Hall of Fame 